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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Shifts Along the American Religious-Secular Spectrum
Ariela Keysar*
This paper examines three dimensions of American religion--belonging, behavior and belief--by creating a
single, unified scale of religiosity and testing it with the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) and
the General Social Survey (GSS). It shows that certain combinations of those three variables are far more
common than others, and demonstrates changes over time in the percentage of people belonging to each
cluster, with a trend toward diminishing religiosity. The paper identifies socio-demographic and geographic
factors that are associated with the religiosity cluster to which a person belongs. The paper examines the
ability of the new scale to predict how people will answer questions on contentious societal issues, using
belief in evolution as a case study. The most religious definitely reject human evolution while the most secular definitely believe in it.

Introduction
Sociologists of religion often measure religiosity along
three dimensions, known informally as the three B’s—
belonging to or identifying with a religious group; religious behavior such as membership in a congregation
and attendance in religious services; and belief in God.
Edgell (2012: 258) asserts that “religion’s influence on
an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and actions may … vary
across time or social location.” This paper concentrates on
the American context in the early 21st Century. Its contributions are fivefold: First, to segment the U.S. population into eight groups based on their yes or no answers
on each of the three dimensions of religion by creating
a 2x2x2 matrix of belonging/behavior/belief. Second,
to place those eight groups along a spectrum to create a
single unified scale of religiosity. Third, to examine shifts
over time in the ways the population is divided into the
eight groups. Fourth, to identify socio-demographic factors that are associated with a person’s position on the
spectrum. Fifth, to test the power of this new measure by
examining its ability to predict how people answer questions on contentious societal issues, using belief in evolution as a case study.
The main data sets utilized in the paper, the American
Religious Identification Survey series, do not track the
same individuals over time but rather look at increases
and decreases in the size of population groups. The large
national data sets are the best currently available to create
a unified religiosity scale based on the three B’s and to test
its application. This paper focuses on the experiences of
individuals rather than congregations or denominations.
Its contribution is primarily empirical.

* Trinity College, Connecticut, USA
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Background and Hypotheses

Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Religiosity

Patterns of religiosity in America have been extensively
researched. Some empirical studies have found stable levels of religiosity (Presser and Chaves, 2007), while others
have found changes over time (Putnam, 2000; Schwadel,
2013). The different conclusions can be attributed in part
to the sources of data used and in part to which aspect
of religiosity the authors focus on: belonging, behavior,
or belief.
To some scholars who focus on behavior, modernization, consumerism and economic constraints explain the
decline in religious practice, as non-religious activities compete for limited and precious time (Robinson and Godbey,
1999; Gruber and Hungerman 2008). Disillusionment
with religious institutions and their leaders, and erosion
of confidence and trust in these institutions, may also
distance people from religious community. The General
Social Survey (GSS) showed a decline in public trust in all
institutions (besides the military) since 1976. Organized
religion did not fare well. Gallup (2013) showed that while
43% of Americans in 1973 expressed a “great deal” of confidence in “the church or organized religion,” by 2012 only
25% did. Other scholars argue that the rise of the Nones
has been counterbalanced by a corresponding rise in the
super-religious—in other words, they see an increase in
polarization (Finke and Stark, 2005; Hout et al., 2001;
Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000; Wuthnow, 1988). Yet
others, faced with evidence of declines in belonging and
behavior, have asserted that religiosity overall has not
declined, because belief remains intact. Hout and Fischer
(2002), for example, examined three possible explanations for the rise of the Nones (those who report no religious affiliation, regardless of their belief or behavior).
Their three explanations are secularization, demographics, and politics. They reject the secularization explanation
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mainly because the majority of American Nones believe
in God and an afterlife. They argue that the demographic
explanation cannot wholly explain the rise of the Nones
because demographic processes are too slow to account
for the sudden change in religiosity. They conclude that
politics was the primary factor. The growing detachment
from organized religion in their view is associated with a
backlash against the political powers of the religious right.
Proponents of the privatization hypothesis assert that
even if fewer Americans report a religious affiliation,
they continue to believe in God and have a spiritual life
(Berger, 1967; Bibby, 1987; Luckmann, 1967; Swatos and
Christiano, 2000). Chaves (2011) argues, for example,
that “There is more to religious involvement than participation in organized religion.” Likewise, Idler (2001) says
that private engagement in prayer and meditation is more
prevalent than public attendance in religious services.
Davie (1994) described the pattern in Britain as “Believing
without belonging.” But this is not the only possible
pattern. Day (2011) titled her recent book Believing in
Belonging. Based on data from Europe and North America,
she describes how people choose religious identification
to complement other social and emotional experiences
of ‘belongings.’ Using GSS data, Sherkat (2011) describes
a pattern of belonging without believing. Sherkat argues
that in the United States, unlike in other countries, there
are more people who belong to religious groups who do
not believe in God than there are people who believe but
do not belong to religious groups.
Measuring the Three Dimensions of Religiosity

Discourse on the first B, belonging to or identifying with
a religious group, has become contentious, specifically
with regard to the rise of American Nones. This rise is a
new phenomenon. As recently as 2000 Swatos and Christiano (2000: 8) suggested, “Virtually no empirical research
supports the prediction of a societal slide from a peak of
sacrality into a valley of secularity.” Since then there has
been a substantial increase in the percentage of Americans who report no religious affiliation (i.e., Nones; see
Hout and Fischer, 2002; Kosmin et al., 2009; Putnam &
Campbell, 2010; Pew, 2012). Pew Research reports that the
number of unaffiliated totaled 36 million adults in 2007
and grew to 47 million in 2012 (Pew 2012).
The second B, behavior, is measured by whether or not
one chooses to devote time and financial resources to
membership in a religious congregation. (This contrasts
with the first B, belonging, which is strictly a measure
of self-identification.) The public is almost evenly split
between members and non-members of religious institutions. Some people join a congregation because it ties
them to a religious community, which also provides social
connections and support (Wuthnow, 1999). However,
this involves commitment on the part of the individual
or the family. Generally, participation in religious activities requires both economic and social commitments,
payment of donations or fees, and conformance to the
policy, schedule and set of rules of the congregation and
its leaders. Given the voluntary nature of active religious
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participation and membership, only half of the population opts in.
To minimize risk of social desirability bias inherent in
self-report data collection (Hadway, et al., 1993; Presser
and Stinson, 1998), Presser and Chaves (2007) looked
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics American Time Use
Survey (ATUS). The ATUS records daily activities of a random sample of Americans 15 years and older. By asking respondents to report all types of activities, hour by
hour, ATUS tracks Americans’ religious behaviors without
directly asking them questions that might lead them to
exaggerate. The estimates for Sunday attendance based
on ATUS data1 for “religious and spiritual activities” range
between 26% and 28% from 2003–2007 (Presser and
Chaves, ibid.).
There is contradictory evidence on stability versus
change in religious behavior. Presser and Chaves (2007)
found stable weekly attendance of about 40% of the adult
population at religious services from 1990 to 2006 based
on General Social Surveys and American National Election
Studies. The GSS asks, “How often do you attend religious
services?” But the General Social Survey data from 1972–
2008 showed an increase in the percentages of Americans
who never attend religious services from about 13% in the
early 1990s to 22% in 2008 (Chaves, 2011). That decline
points to a shift toward less religious activity in the past
two decades, corroborating our findings.
On the third B, belief in God, most surveys have failed to
capture the complexity and nuance of Americans’ belief.
This is not—or should not—be a simple yes-or-no question. The conventional wisdom that the United States is
overwhelmingly a nation of believers (Wuthnow, 1988;
Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Lipset, 1996; Newport, 2012),
while correct, obscures more than it reveals. The empirical evidence created by the basic question asked in the
Gallup Polls since 1944, “Do you believe in God?” shows
that well over 90% of Americans answer “yes”—affirming
their belief in God. However, the percentage answering
“no” rose from 1% in 1967 to 7% in 2011 (Gallup, 2011).
As I will show, the sharp rise in “no” answers is just one
indicator of a widespread degradation of religious belief
in America.
This standard question on belief in God unintentionally overestimated the intensity of belief (Bishop 1999),
as it masked what people actually think regarding the
existence of God. In fact, levels drop drastically when
Americans are asked more specific belief questions. For
instance, when asked how certain they are about their
belief in God, only 72% said “absolutely certain” in 1996.
Furthermore, refined responses help distinguish between
types of beliefs about God. As illustrated by an example from a GSS belief question asked in 1993, 1994 and
1998, a person who chose “I don’t believe in God” could
be classified as an atheist; “I don’t know whether there is
God, and I don’t believe there is any way to find out” as
an agnostic; “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do
believe in a higher power of some kind” as a deist; “I know
that God exists and I have no doubts about it” as a theist and a firm believer (only 63% in 1998). There are two
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additional optional responses in the GSS of less committed
believers: “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in
God” and “I find myself believing in God some of the time,
but not at others.” (For full comparisons between levels of
beliefs generated by different types of survey questions,
see Bishop, 1999). Differences in questions asked over the
years make it difficult to determine whether belief in God
has diminished over time. Wuthnow (1988), citing the
Gallup polls, asserted that most Americans claim some
belief in God; however, fewer Americans than in the past
are certain about their belief. Those who are absolutely
sure God exists dropped from 66% of adults in 2003 to
54% in 2013 in Harris Poll surveys (2013).
Belief in the divine is the most common way American
people express their religiosity. As pointed out by Bishop
(1999), question wording regarding belief affects how
respondents understand and respond. Agreeing that “God
exists,” one might argue, is effortless (Beit-Hallahmi and
Argyle, 1997). In fact, by following the majority, people
dissociate themselves from the outcast atheists. In the U.S.,
after all, atheists are the most distrusted religious group
(Edgell, et al., 2006). In a recent public opinion poll four
out of ten Americans (43%) said that they would not vote
for a presidential candidate who is an atheist,2 compared
with 5% who would not vote for a Catholic candidate, 6%
for a Jewish candidate, 18% for a Mormon candidate, and
40% for a Muslim candidate (Gallup, 2012).
Belief in the divine is the most persistent of the three
B’s. It is the stronghold of religiosity. But this stronghold rarely stands alone. Anthropologist T.M. Luhrmann
(2012) argues that belief is socially situated: It follows
from rather than causes religious belonging and behavior.
If this is so, then it should be expected that people will
lose belief after ceasing belonging and behavior, and conversely gaining belief after affiliating with a religion and
joining a congregation.
The next step is to build a religious-secular continuum
that combines the three B’s into a single scale. This allows
us to extract meaning and draw conclusions that aren’t
obvious from regarding each of the three B’s separately.
Movement in one direction along the continuum represents secularization, while movement in the other represents deepening of religiosity. This approach is not
without controversy. Pearce et al. (2013) argue against
measuring religiosity along a continuum from low to
high. The authors chose to create five latent classes based
on 12 indicators of religiosity in their study of American
adolescents, naming the classes abiders, adapters, assenters, avoiders, and atheists. However, this approach has its
own difficulties. Aside from the least religious and most
religious groups—“atheists” and “abiders”—the classes are
hard to distinguish from one another. They overlap significantly in beliefs, experiences and practices.
Despite intense interest and debate, the lack of an
agreed-upon metric of secularization before now has complicated social scientists’ ability to reach consensus on the
extent of the phenomenon. Fortunately, relevant data are
available in the American Religious Identification Surveys
(ARIS) of 2001 and 2008 and the General Social Surveys
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(GSS) of 1988, 2000, and 2010. It is impossible to track
the religious journeys of individuals in surveys that collect
only aggregate data. What is possible is to see the process
of secularization unfold through the decline and growth
of different population clusters, from the fully religious by
the three measures of religiosity to the fully secular.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis I
I hypothesize that for society as a whole, the first of
the three B’s to decline is religious behavior. It is followed by a decrease in religious identification, and
only then by a decline in belief in the divine. Therefore the transformation from the most religious to
the least religious pattern on the religious-secular
spectrum will generate certain combinations of the
three B’s that are more common than others. For
example, the cell of the matrix representing people
who lack belief but display religious behavior and
belonging is predicted to be quite small.
What variables explain movements along the religious-secular spectrum? Demographic traits and religious upbringing help explain religious and non-religious behaviors
and attitudes. One of the most notable features of the
rising Nones is their demographic profile—young, male,
and highly educated (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006; Baker
and Smith, 2009). The Pew survey (2012) found that 32%
of young Americans have no religious affiliation, while
according to ARIS 2008 29% of Americans 18–29 years
old professed no religion (Kosmin, and Keysar, 2009). Religious leaders have long observed the demographic gap in
their pews. Many young people find organized religion
irrelevant and outdated (Religious News Service, 2012).
For psychologists youth is associated with rebellion and
rejection of organized religion (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle,
1997; Keysar, 2007). Older Americans are more likely to be
sure of God’s existence (Keysar, 2007).
Gender is another important demographic attribute
associated with religious and secularity gaps. Intensity of
religiosity and worldviews is gendered. Persistently different patterns for men and women have been observed
in Western societies (Baker and Smith, 2009). Women
are well known to be more religiously active than men
(Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1997). In Western European
and Scandinavian societies, men were found more likely
to be non-believers in an afterlife who ‘never pray’
(Furseth, 2010).
Women tend to seek comfort and emotional support in
religion, while men express a greater tendency to disbelieve and reject authority (e.g. Beit-Hallahmi, forthcoming). Socialization is one factor. Many women are raised
to be mothers and to take care of their families (Douglas,
1977), and be nurturing and submissive, qualities that are
associated with greater levels of religiousness (Thompson,
1991). Voas and Crockett (2005: 24) studied religious patterns in Britain and asserted that “daughters are generally
inﬂuenced by their mothers – and there are signs in the
data that maternal inﬂuence on religiosity is stronger for
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female than for male teenagers – the gender gap may be
partly self-perpetuating.”
Miller and Stark (2002) challenged the religious socialization theory, which holds that the different societal roles
assigned to men and women help explain the differences
in their religiosity. In a cross-cultural and cross-religion
exploration they offered risk-taking as an alternative
approach, claiming that non-belief and irreligious behavior involve risk-taking. “Failure to conform in terms of
beliefs and practices, or the commission of ‘sins,’ can
result in serious consequences, such as going to hell” (ibid.
1404). Men are known to be risk-takers in other domains,
such as drinking, drug use, smoking and adultery, as well
as in financial decision-making. These risky behaviors may
also apply to irreligious behavior. According to Miller and
Hoffman (1995) reluctant risk-takers were more religious,
effects that held within each gender. Why are women less
likely to be risk-takers? Miller and Hoffman (1995) attributed gender gaps in risk taking to differential socialization,
as boys are encouraged to be courageous and aggressive
while girls are encouraged to be passive and gentle. Miller
and Stark (2002) concluded that differences in risk-taking
probably have a biological rather than sociological explanation. Comparing the United States and Japan using
World Values Survey data (1995), they showed that on
measures of religious affiliation, practice and belief in the
supernatural, gender differences were by far smaller and
less significant for the Japanese than Americans, explaining the narrower gender difference by the lower risk of
being irreligious in Japan.
Economists of religion also challenge the importance of
religious socialization, arguing that while it applies to traditional societies it is less relevant in modern industrialized
economies. Economists of religion apply a human capital
framework (Iannaccone, 1990). They say that in societies with a traditional familial division of labor, religion
is regarded as a household commodity, which belongs to
the female sphere. As women make strides in higher education and increase their participation in the labor force,
economic realities overwhelm traditional religious socialization. As women take upon themselves tasks that were
previously assigned to men, traditional religious practices
are also challenged, and women’s religious involvement
and worldviews may change as well. In pursuit of empowerment, some women join new religious movements and
alternative spiritual communities (Berger, 1998; Finley,
1994); some try to feminize their religious community;
others simply follow their male counterparts and reject
organized religion (Furseth, 2010).
Geography also plays a role. The geographic clustering of
American non-identifiers, non-members and non-believers
in the West fits its classification as the “none zone” in the
Religion by Region series (Killen and Silk, 2004).
This leads to the second hypothesis:

and young Americans to be more secular, and those
who reside in the South to be more religious.

Hypothesis II
I hypothesize that one’s place on the 2x2x2 matrix of
belonging/behavior/belief will differ systematically
by demographic characteristics, such as gender, age,
geography, and religion. Specifically, I expect men

The third hypothesis examines the connection between
religiosity and public opinion. The American public is
divided on societal issues, which often develop into political rifts. Fiorina and Abrams (2008: 584) described the
polarization of the American public along lines of religiosity as well as political membership, asserting, “A signiﬁcant
degree of sorting has occurred, however—most clearly
between members of the two parties, but also along lines
of religion and possibly geographic location.”
Some of the debates are over legalizing same-sex marriages and abortions. Other discourses challenge the scientific community over stem cell research and school
curriculum, mainly science education. These debates,
often characterized as culture wars, reflect people’s religiosity and secularity (Keysar and Kosmin, 2008; Kosmin,
2013). For methodological reasons and availability of data,
this paper focuses on attitudes relating to science, which
are at the heart of societal debates on public policy issues.
One important issue in the culture wars is evolution.
The American public is deeply divided over accepting or
rejecting human evolution3 (Miller and Pennock, 2008).
This division directly influences battles over science education and contributes to the emergence of ideological politics (Mooney, 2005; Pennock, 2005). A great deal
has been written on Americans’ attitudes toward scientific issues, ranking the U.S. nearly last in acceptance of
evolution (only Turkey ranks lower among 34 surveyed
nations;4 see Miller, Scott and Okamoto, 2006). Evolution
challenges fundamentalist Christians’ teachings about
God’s powers and the belief that human beings are the
direct creation of God (Pennock, 2007). The creationist
movement’s battles over scientific curriculum, inflamed
by religious motivations, are seen by some as “part of a
broad assault on rationality and on secular institutions”
(Blackburn, 2008: 45). Religious fundamentalist worldviews clash with science over the issue of human evolution; as Miller and Pennock (2008) explain, “The antipathy
that so many Americans feel toward the idea of being
related to animals is part of the reason that the religious
right has used evolution as a political wedge issue” (17).
These attitudes towards scientific issues are significantly
related to Americans’ self-identification with a religious
group. When asked in 2008, “Do you think that human
beings, as we know them, developed from earlier species
of animals?” 17% of Americans in general said they ‘definitely’ accept human evolution while 36% said ‘definitely
not.’ However, Americans who profess no religion in 2008
exhibited notably different worldviews: 33% ‘definitely’
accepted human evolution while 17% said ‘definitely not.’
(Kosmin, et al. 2009). Attitudes towards human evolution
have never before been tested against the combinations
of the three B’s.
This leads to the third and fourth hypotheses:
Hypothesis III
I hypothesize that one’s position on the religious-secular spectrum is related to one’s attitudes towards
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current social debates, specifically towards human
evolution. Moreover, I hypothesize that Americans
who reject the theory of human evolution will cluster
in the religious end of the spectrum.

Two methodological adjustments were introduced in
the data collection of ARIS 2008. In 2008 the traditional
landline interviews were supplemented with a national
cell phone survey to include the growing segment of the
population who use cellular telephones exclusively. In
addition, interviews were conducted both in English and
Spanish. The use of cell phones interviews and inclusion
of Spanish interviews increased the coverage and reduced
the non-representation bias.

Hypothesis IV
I hypothesize that the religious-secular scale is a useful tool to assess people’s perceptions on ideological
and educational issues. Specifically, I believe that
the most religious and the most secular remain at
opposite poles on attitudes towards human evolution even after demographic and religious variables
are controlled for.
Methods
This paper utilizes several sources of data. For the exploratory analysis and creation of the religious-secular scale,
I utilize the American Religious Identification Surveys
(ARIS). To validate the scale generated by the ARIS data, I
supplement it by creating similar grids utilizing the General Social Surveys (GSS). For the multivariate regression
analysis, I use the ARIS 2008 data.
I conduct both descriptive and multivariate statistical
analyses. Four regression models test shifts along the religious-secular spectrum. Similar to hierarchical steps, in
each model I add more variables. I start with socio-demographic factors, add geography, then religious indicators,
and lastly worldviews as predictors for shifts along the
religious-secular spectrum from the most religious point
to the most secular point.
Data Sources
American Religious Identification Surveys (2001 & 2008)

The data are drawn from the findings of the American
Religious Identification Survey series, in particular ARIS
2001 and ARIS 2008. Both ARIS 2001 and ARIS 2008 are
nationally representative random-digit-dialed telephone
surveys, each with more than 50,000 adult respondents:
ARIS 2001 with 50,281 and ARIS 2008 with 54,461. The
data are based on self-reporting in response to an openended question: What is your religion, if any? Religious
self-identification is not based on whether established
religious (or non-religious) bodies, institutions, churches,
mosques, or synagogues consider them to be members.
To the contrary, the surveys sought to determine whether
the respondents regarded themselves as adherents of a
religious community. The open-ended approach generated a significant number of responses or categories of
religious groups, faiths, and denominations (Kosmin and
Keysar, 2006). Similarly, other segments of the American
population, those who self-identify as “atheist,” “secular,”
or “humanist,” chose these options voluntarily.
For a more detailed inquiry into religious beliefs, ARIS
2001 incorporated a nationally representative sub-sample of 17,911 adults, collecting information on beliefs in
God and membership in religious institutions, while ARIS
2008 utilized a nationally representative sample, albeit
smaller, of 1,015 adults who were asked more detailed
questions on life cycle religious behaviors and beliefs in
the divine.

General Social Surveys (1988, 2000, 2010)

The General Social Survey (GSS) is an annual or biennial probability sample of households conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago. Face-to-face interviews are conducted with
one randomly selected adult in selected households. Since
2006 interviews in Spanish have been added. The GSS is
highly regarded due to its high response rates (between
70–80%) and its wide range of demographic, behavioral
and attitudinal questions, including special societal and
political topics. Many of the core questions have remained
unchanged since 1972, allowing investigators to conduct
trend studies. Unlike the ARIS series, the GSS main question on religion provides closed options to choose from:
What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?
Measuring the 3 B’s—Descriptive Analysis
1. Belonging to, or Identifying with, a Religious Group

Belonging is measured by answers to the open-ended
question: What is your religion, if any? For purposes of this
article, survey respondents are categorized as “belonging” if they self-identify with a religious group, whether
or not they are official members or belong to a particular
congregation or attend services. One important measure
of secularity is professing no religion. People who profess
no religion include those who replied “none,” “agnostic,”
“atheist,” “secular” and “humanist” to the open-ended religious identification question. They numbered 14 million
adults in 1990, 29 million in 2001 and over 34 million in
2008 (ARIS 2008).
In all, the responses aggregated as “No Religion”
amounted to 8.2% of the American adult population in
1990, 14.1% in 2001 and 15.0% in 2008. These findings
were corroborated by the General Social Survey (GSS) in
2004. The GSS asked: “What is your religious preference?”
and 14.3% said “none.” A survey by Pew found that 16% of
adult respondents said they were religiously unaffiliated
in 2007 and just under 20% in 2012 (Pew, 2007, 2012).
Of those people who reply “none” to a survey question
on religious identification, only a fraction self-identifies
as “agnostic” or “atheist.” Nevertheless, these small groups
have almost doubled in number from 1.9 million in 2001
to over 3.6 million adults or 1.6% in 2008.
2. (Religious) Behavior

Another obvious social manifestation of being connected
to religion is one’s behavior, and one way this can be indicated is by membership in a religious congregation. The
reasons for not being a member of a religious congrega-
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tion vary widely, from ideological attitudes to physical
access issues. Although the population of those who are
members of a religious congregation is very large, ARIS
2001 found that at the beginning of the 21st century,
46% of American adults, nearly 100 million people, did
not regard themselves as or claim to be members of religious congregations.
It is hard to assess to what extent members of houses of
worship are religiously active. Therefore, ARIS 2008 looked
at participation in religious services and did not simply
ask about congregational membership. Despite the limitations, one can assume that those who attend religious
services regularly are also members. In general, ARIS 2008
showed that 55% of American adults said they attend once
a month or more often, 20% of Americans said they never
attend religious services and 23% said they attend only a
few times a year. (As noted above, these numbers are subject to over-reporting.) The latter group could be intermarried, leading the nonreligious partner to join his/her more
religious family member occasionally at services. Putting
these latter two groups together, 43% of Americans say
they do not attend religious services regularly5.
3. Belief in God

A new belief question was introduced in ARIS 2008 to
better understand people’s perceptions regarding the
existence of God. While 70% “definitely” believe in a personal God, an additional 12% believe that there is a higher
power but no personal God. These two categories combined (82% of respondents) are approximately the same
as the single category from the 2001 survey, those who
believe in the existence of God, which comprised 95% of
respondents. The remaining categories from the 2008 survey are hard to describe as believers. They are “there is no
such thing” (2%), “there is no way to know” (4%), “I’m not
sure” (6%) and refused (6%).
The Complexity of the Three B's

The three dimensions of religiosity and secularity reveal
the complexity of slicing the American religious/secular
pie. Each dimension when looked at separately shows a
different pattern revealing the asymmetric relationship of
the religious/secular in each dimension:
• Belonging (Identification):
◦◦ In 2001 & 2008 there was an 80/20 split between
identifiers and non-identifiers.
• Behavior (Membership/Attendance):
◦◦ In 2001 & 2008 there was a 50/50 split between
members and non-members in religious organizations.
◦◦ In 2008 there was a 55/45 split between attenders
and non-attenders in religious services.
• Belief in God:
◦◦ In 2001 there was a 95/5 split between believers
and non-believers in the existence of God.
◦◦ In 2008 there was an 82/18 split between believers and non-believers in a personal God or higher
power.
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Creating a Scale: Belonging, Behaving and Believing
2001 & 2008

To capture all three dimensions together, I created a scale
which takes into account for each respondent whether s/
he 1) identifies with a religious group; 2) holds household
membership in a religious institution (2001) or attends
religious services regularly (2008); and 3) believes in God,
i.e., agrees that “God exists” (2001) or believes in a personal God or higher power (2008).
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the overall distribution
of these eight (2x2x2) options for both 2001 and 2008.
They show how the frequency of the eight combinations
of belonging, behaving and believing have changed over
time. Although some of the measurements were modified in the two surveys, they remain similar enough that
changes can still be monitored. The challenge is to create
a linear scale for the degree of religiosity using dichotomous variables of qualities that are not directly comparable. In the regression analysis (below), clusters are created
based on the number of “yes” answers a respondent gave
on the three B questions: 0, 1, 2, or 3. The ordering within
each cluster was based on the level of religiosity of the different combinations as discussed below.
Because this is not a longitudinal study, it is impossible
to follow individuals over time to observe their movement
between the eight groups. I can only infer individuals’
movements from changes in the relative sizes of the
groups. I make the parsimonious assumption for this
study that when people shift, it is to a neighboring cluster,
such as from (yes, yes, yes) to (yes, no, yes). Support for this
assumption is provided by a longitudinal study of young
Conservative Jews from 1995 to 2003, which showed a
large number of students ceasing to attend services while
still belonging and believing, but few or none jumping
from fully religious in one survey wave to fully secular in
the next (Keysar and Kosmin 2004). Certainly there are
some individuals who do so, but they are outliers.
Results

1. Using ARIS Data

Two results emerge: Wide variation in degrees of religiosity, and a trend toward secularity at all points along the
spectrum. There is a decrease in the share of Americans in
the most religious groups and a corresponding increase in
the least religious groups. The most religious group shrank
slightly from 54.5% to 53% but still constitutes the largest sub-group of the adult population. It represents adults
who report identifying with a religion, holding religious
membership or attending services regularly, and believing
in God (the most religious category – (yes, yes, yes)).
More noticeably at the other end of the scale, there is
a doubling of the most secular combination: people who
do not identify with a religious group, do not belong to
a congregation or never attend religious services (or go
just a few times a year), and are atheists or agnostics with
regard to a personal God (no, no, no).
Changes also occur in the middle points of the scale
where the three dimensions are not the same (in other
words, not all ‘yes’ or all ‘no’). On the secular side of the
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Identification

Membership/Attendance

Belief in God

Share of Population
2001

Share of Population
2008

No

No

No

2.8%

6.0%**

No

No

Yes

8.2%

9.5%**

Yes

No

No

1.0%

4.1%**

No

Yes

No

0.5%

<1%

Yes

Yes

No

0.7%

1.1%*

No

Yes

Yes

2.2%

<1%**

Yes

No

Yes

30.0%

24.7%**

Yes

Yes

Yes

54.5%

53%**

Table 1: Religious Identification, Membership/Attendance and Belief U.S. Adult Population, 2001 and 2008 (weighted).
Sources: American Religious Identification Survey, 2001 n = 17,911; American Religious Identification Survey, 2008
n = 1,015
**

< .01; * < .05

Legend (excluding ‘don’t know’ and ‘refuse’ in both surveys)
2001
Identification: Yes = Identifies with a religion; No = ‘None,’ ‘Atheist,’ ‘Agnostic’ ‘Secular,’ ‘Humanist’
Membership: Yes/No Is anyone in your HH currently a member of a church, temple, or mosque?
Belief that God Exists: Yes = Agree strongly/Agree somewhat; No = Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly
2008
Identification: Yes = Identifies with a religion; No = ‘None,’ ‘Atheist,’ ‘Agnostic’ ‘Secular,’ ‘Humanist’
Attendance: Yes = Attend more than once a week/ Once a week/ Once or twice a month; No = A few times a year/Never
Belief in God: Yes = There is definitely a personal God/ There is a higher power but no personal God; No = There is no
such thing/There is no way to know/ I am not sure

Figure 1: Changes in Belonging, Behavior, and Belief. Source: ARIS 2001 and ARIS 2008
Legend: See Table 1
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spectrum are those who belong yet do not believe or
behave religiously (yes, no, no). Although this is a small
minority, it is four times its share of the American population compared with 2001.
On the religious side of the spectrum there is a significant decrease (from 30% to 25%) in those who belong, do
not participate regularly in religious services, yet believe
in a personal God (yes, no, yes). However, this remains the
second biggest group of Americans, outnumbered only by
the most religious group (yes, yes, yes). Although I am not
tracking the same people over time, ceasing regular participation in religious services remains a common choice
for Americans, presumably when they leave the (yes, yes,
yes) group. The fact that this group’s share of the population shrank from 2001 to 2008 suggests that some people
who were once in the (yes, no, yes) group have taken a further step away from religiosity, to (no, no, yes) or (yes, no,
no). Those two groups together grew by 4.4 percentage
points from 2001 to 2008—coincidentally, about the same
as the decrease in the (yes, no, yes). Clearly the transition
from a religious to a more secular society is not a drastic change from one extreme (yes, yes, yes) to the other
extreme (no, no, no).
Further evidence for the importance of membership
and attendance as a bulwark of religiosity is that people
who do attend services are highly unlikely to drop either
of the other two B’s. It is rare to find a person who attends
but does not believe (yes, yes, no)=1%, or who attends but
does not have a religious identification (no, yes, yes)<1%,
or who attends but does not believe or have a religious
identification (no, yes, no)<1%.
Beyond a shift towards more secularity, Figure 1 illustrates the particularity of American religion and nonreligion. There are persisting combinations, while other
combinations along the religious-secular spectrum do
not survive. Most notably, the pattern of believing without belonging (no, no, yes), constituting one in every
ten Americans, is more common than belonging without believing (yes, no, no), supporting the claim that
belief is the last bastion of American religion. This latter
group, although small (only 4%), seems to have gained
adherents at the beginning of the 21st Century. These are
people who are probably attached to a religious group
nominally. They do not attend religious services regularly
nor do they express belief in a personal God. Affiliation
with a religious group might reflect family loyalty and
nostalgic sentiments toward their religious upbringing
(Beit-Hallahmi, 1997).
It is quite revealing to document which religious-secular combinations are rare or even endangered, namely,
attending religious services without belonging to a religious group or believing in God (no, yes, no). Some people
might feel lost in houses of worship without an attachment to a specific religious group or strong belief in
the divine. Likewise, the share of Americans who do not
belong yet behave or believe is shrinking (less than 1%). In
other words, I could hardly find any Americans who attend
religious services regularly and believe in a personal God
yet do not identify with a religious group (no, yes, yes),
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or non-believers who identify with a religious group and
participate at services regularly (yes, yes, no), perhaps
because the latter as non-believers feel uncomfortable in
religious congregations and communities.
2. Corroboration from GSS

NORC’s General Social Survey allows us to create a similar
religious-secular grid of identification/attendance/belief
for 1988, 2000 and 2010, when the same questions were
administered by the GSS.
GSS data corroborate the ARIS trend data by showing
how the two polarities, the religious and secular, change
over time. As the share of the most secular segment
goes up, the share of the religious part is going down.
Furthermore, the earlier starting point for the GSS allows
for a longer time span than ARIS. The results show a
greater drop in the share of the most religious segment of
American society (yes, yes, yes) from 63% in 1988 to 54%
in 2010, and an increase in the most secular segment of
American society (no, no, no) from 2% in 1988 to 7% in
2010. The share of believers who neither identify with a
religious group nor attend religious services (no, no, yes)
increases from 5% in 1988 to 10% in 2010, according to
GSS (See Figure 2).
Beyond portraying similar trends, the GSS and ARIS data
establish remarkably similar estimates on both ends and
the middle of the religious-secular spectrum.
Looking at several cohorts in the GSS, Sherkat (2011)
also finds a growing segment of Americans who neither believe nor belong to religious organizations. ARIS
revealed the initial dimension – participation in religious
services – decreased when society experienced shifts in
religiosity. Both ARIS and GSS data provide support for
hypothesis I by showing that most of the change on the
religious-secular grid to date has been in religious behavior, with a smaller decrease in religious identification, and
only small changes in belief. However, aggregate data
cannot fully establish the validity of this hypothesis. That
will require a longitudinal study showing the sequence of
movements of individuals between the different cells of
the 2x2x2 matrix.
ARIS and GSS data show that the most prevalent secular Americans are people who do not identify or behave
religiously but do believe in God (no, no, yes) and those
who totally distance themselves from all three dimensions
of religion (no, no, no). But another group has gained in
numbers: identifiers who do not participate in religious
services and do not believe in the divine (yes, no, no).
There is also a group that has almost disappeared: (no,
yes, yes). These are people who do not identify with a religious group but do attend religious services regularly and
believe in God.
3. Socio-demographics
A. Gender

In 2001 men dominate (72%) the small group of non-identifiers who are involved with a religious institution and
don’t believe in God (no, yes, no). Indeed, the top three
most male groups (at least 2/3 male) are non-believers.
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Figure 2: 'Corroboration from GSS: Changes in Identification, Attendance, and Belief. Source: GSS
Legend
Identification: Yes = all religions; No = no religion
Behavior: How Often Attend Religious Services?
Yes = Attend several times a year/once a month/2–3 times a month/nearly every week/ every week or more; No = Never
attend religious services/ less than once a year/ once a year
Belief: Respondent’ Confidence in the Existence of God?
Yes = Some higher power/ believe sometimes/ believe but doubts/ know God exists; No = Do not believe/ no way to
find out
The fourth group from the top, again a small one, consists of those who don’t identify with a religious group, yet
are members of religious institutions and believe in God.
Females, on the other hand, dominate only two groups,
the two most religious combinations, which are the largest groupings, representing almost 80% of the adult population. In both of these combinations people believe in
God and self-identify with a religious group (See Figure 3).
The relatively small sample in 2008 precludes a similar
detailed presentation of the eight-point scale by gender.
Even so, similar patterns persist. Most striking, both in
2001 and in 2008 men are twice as likely as women to be
in the most secular group, (no, no, no), and also among
the believers who do not belong and do not attend services, (no, no, yes).
About 10% of men in 2008 are found at the extreme
(no, no, no) category. An additional 10% follow the
(no, no, yes) pattern. That means that one in every five
males is in these two secular groupings. Similarly, 47%

of males versus 58% of females are found in the most
religious category (yes, yes, yes). Moreover, the (yes, no,
yes) grouping, the group of non-attenders, which plummeted in 2008, decreased mainly among men, from 30%
in 2001 to 22% 2008 (and from 32% to 26% respectively
among women).
B. Age

Two groupings stand out because of their large number of
young people. More than half of the (no, yes, yes) category
consists of young adults under age 35, and 47% of the (no,
no, yes) category is under age 35. As expected, young people are found in the three non-believer groups: (no, no, no),
(no, yes, no), and (yes, no, no). In each about 42% of group
members are adults under age 35. In 2008, young people
are over-represented among non-identifying adults, who
don’t attend services regularly, yet believe in a personal
God (no, no, yes), and among those who belong, but do
not behave or believe (yes, no, no). Two groups stand out
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Figure 3: Religious Identification, Membership and Belief Scale by Gender in 2001. Source: ARIS 2001
in 2008, the believers who do not belong or behave religiously, the (no, no, yes) and the most religious one, (yes,
yes, yes). While the first group is relatively young, the last
one, the most populous, is far older.
C. Geography

The two polarities of the religious-secular spectrum are
concentrated in different geographic regions. While the
growing, yet small, secular polarity (no, no, no) is most
likely to be found in the West (about 40%), the somewhat
dwindling religious polarity (yes, yes, yes) is most likely to
be found in the South (again about 40%). Similarly, the
other religious segment (yes, no, yes) is most likely to be
found in the South.
D. Upbringing and Life Cycle Behavior

Among people who had a religious initiation, such as a
baptism, christening, circumcision, confirmation, bar
mitzvah or naming ceremony, indicating some religious
upbringing, 60% believe, behave and belong (yes, yes,
yes) as adults, compared with only 42% of those who did
not have a religious initiation. Those who did not have an
initiation are by far more likely to be in the most secular
grouping (no, no, no): 13% compared with 5% of those
who had an initiation ceremony. Although these results
are highly significant they are correlations and do not
indicate a causal relationship.
I hypothesized (II) that the type of dimension (belonging/behavior/belief) one loses might be different

systematically by demographic characteristics and geography. That was supported. Americans who reside in the
South are more religious in all three dimensions. The evidential gender gaps clearly support hypothesis II whereby
more men are clustered in the secular parts of the religious-secular grid.
E. Attitudes toward Human Evolution

The most non-religious (no, no, no) people overwhelmingly accept human evolution. In contrast, people at the
other extreme (yes, yes, yes) overwhelmingly reject it.
In between, believers, the (no, no, yes), are split almost
evenly in their opinions on human evolution, while
identifiers, the (yes, no, no) people, tilt toward accepting
human evolution. But the pattern reverses toward rejection of human evolution among the (yes, no, yes) grouping. In other words, believers who identify with a religious
group but do not participate in religious services regularly
tend to adopt a religious view toward human evolution.
When I combined three small groups, (no, yes, no), (no,
yes, yes) and (yes, yes, no), into one group—an ambivalent
group—there is a strong linear relationship between the
support of human evolution and the religious-secular
scale. The more secular a person the more likely s/he finds
human evolution to be “definitely true.” Simultaneously,
flat denial of human evolution peaks at 78% among the
most religious group and drops sharply to 9% among the
most secular group. Figure 4 shows that the “somewhat
secular” (no, no, yes), believers who neither identify nor
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Figure 4: Attitudes toward Human Evolution and the Belonging, Behavior, and Belief Scale 2008. Acceptance of Evolution by Religiosity: Most and Least Accepting. Source: ARIS 2008
actively engage with religion, are at the crossover point:
roughly equal numbers of them describe human evolution as “definitely false” and “definitely true.”
Figure 5 shows a gap between the two poles on the religious-secular scale. The most secular group overwhelmingly believes in human evolution (78% said “definitely
yes”) while a great majority of the most religious group
flatly rejects it (78% said “definitely no”).
The religious-secular grid is highly correlated with
people’s attitudes towards a highly debated social issue,
here measured by attitudes towards human evolution.
This scale effectively exhibits the two polarities of the
American public—the most religious versus the most secular—illustrating how they are harbingers of extremely different worldviews.
Multivariate Models

The multivariate methods aim to explore religiosity and
irreligiosity and also test hypothesis IV. The goal of the
analysis is to test how the various clusters of the three
B’s are created and explore changes in religious intensity.
One way is to monitor the number of positive answers
respondents gave on the three B questions on a scale from
the most secular position with no positive answer, namely
category 0=no, no, no to 1 positive answer, “yes,” to 2 “yes”
and finally, the most religious position with all positive
answers: 3=yes, yes, yes. I predicted that if people lose the
first two dimensions they will soon lose the third and be
regarded as nonreligious. The models segment the population based on socio-demographics, region and religion

in order to predict the likelihood of progressing along the
spectrum of belonging, behaving and believing.
There is, however, one feature of the American religious landscape that needs to be taken into consideration. The belongers, behavers and believers (yes, yes, yes)
constitute half of the American population, arguably
not an extreme group, but rather a majority. In order
to improve the explanatory power of the multivariate
models, I sliced the American pie further by splitting this
large religious group, and creating a 9-point scale (rather
than an 8-point scale). The asterisk after the word yes signifies greater religious intensity. In the “extremely religious” (yes, yes*, yes*) group are Americans who identify
with a religion, attend religious services weekly or a few
times a week, and “definitely” believe in a personal God.
They are about 40% of the adult population. Looking
at their socio-demographics, they are overwhelmingly
older and more likely to be female. The share of the
‘extremely religious’ is far more prevalent in the South
than in other geographic regions, the Northeast or in the
West and Midwest.
Table 2 presents hierarchical regression models for the
9-point religious-secular scale, whereby 1=(no, no, no), i.e.
the most secular group of non-identifiers, non-behavers
and non-believers and at the other extreme, 9=(yes, yes*,
yes*), i.e. the most religious group of identifiers, weekly
attenders who definitely believe in a personal God. To
repeat, in the religious-secular scale, the first item represents identification with a religion, the second represents
attendance at services, and the third represents belief in a
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Figure 5: Probability of Accepting or Rejecting Evolution: The Most Religious versus the Least Religious 2008. Source:
ARIS 2008
Dependent Variable
Predictors

BBB Scale

1 = no, no, no…

8 = yes, yes, yes

9 = yes, yes* yes*

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Demographic
Gender

-.137***

-.138***

-.073*

-.052

.103

.103

**

.082

.041

-.135***

-.093**

-.063*

Initiation

-.115***

-.129***

Religious Funeral

-.465***

-.364***

Age

**

**

Geography
Region
Life Cycle Religious Behavior

Religious Attitudes
Human Evolution
Adjusted R2

-.340***
.031

.048

.291

.385

Table 2: Hierarchical Regression (OLS) of Belonging, Behaving, and Believing 9-Point Scale 2008
***

< .001; ** < .01; * < .05

Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. The baseline are adult females, living in the South, who had a
religious initiation, such as baptism, who expect to have religious funeral services, and do not believe in human evolution. Age is a continuous variable.
personal God. The 9-point scale is defined: 1=(no, no, no);
2=(no, no, yes); 3=(yes, no, no); 4=(no, yes, no); 5=(yes,
yes, no); 6=(no, yes, yes); 7=(yes, no, yes); 8=(yes, yes, yes),
9=(yes, yes*, yes*).
I chose the most religious Americans as the base categories: females, living in the South, who had a religious

initiation, plan a religious funeral, and do not believe in
human evolution. I introduced the various variables in
stages, in all utilizing four models, to predict shifts along
the spectrum from the most secular to the most religious. The first model introduces demographic predictors, the second adds geography, the third adds life-cycle
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religious behavior, and the last adds attitudes towards
human evolution.
Model 1 shows that the demographic factors, gender
and age, are significant predictors of the 9-point religioussecular scale. Being male significantly reduces the likelihood of being placed higher on the religious spectrum
(negative coefficient) while being older is positively associated with greater religiosity. Model 2 indicates a significant effect of region, whereby those who live outside the
South are less likely (negative coefficient) to religiously
belong, behave and believe in 2008.
Model 3 adds religious initiation and end of life ritual,
which elevate substantially the power of the analysis
(Adjusted R2 increases sharply to 0.291). Model 4 increases
the explanatory power even further (Adjusted R2 =0.385)
by adding an attitudinal variable of a contentious topic,
people’s perceptions towards human evolution. Those
who believe in human evolution are the most secular
along with those who do not expect to have a religious
funeral, supporting hypothesis IV. Interestingly, gender is
only marginally significant at the 0.06 level, and age is not
statistically significant in this model. It raises the possibility of an interaction between age and religious attitudes.
I tested the interaction between religiosity and worldviews within each age group to assess whether the effects
of attitudes toward human evolution on the religioussecular spectrum operate differently for younger or older
Americans. Examining the interaction of age and attitude
towards human evolution shows that people’s attitudes
are statistically more important in determining their
placement on the religious-secular scale than their age
is. To illustrate: between 14% (those under 35) and 19%
(those over 35) of believers in human evolution are in the
most secular category (“no” on belonging, “no” on behavior, and “no” on belief) compared with only 1% of those
who do not believe in human evolution regardless of
age. In contrast, between 17% (those under 35) and 19%
(those over 35) of deniers of human evolution are in the
extremely religious group of identifiers, which includes
weekly attenders who definitely believe in a personal God,
compared with 2% - 5% of believers in human evolution.
Limitations

Four limitations should be considered when interpreting
the findings presented. First, the wording of questions
about behaving and belief changed slightly from 2001
to 2008. (There was no change in question wording for
belonging.) While this limitation must be acknowledged,
it is highly unlikely to have affected trend estimates. In
2001, the behavior question asked whether anyone in
the respondent’s household was currently a member of
a church, temple, or mosque. In 2008, the question was
how frequently the respondent attended religious services. The respondent was categorized as a “yes” for behavior if he or she attended more than a few times a year. That
is similar to answering, “yes” in 2001 to being a member of
a religious institution. As for belief, in 2001 people were
asked if they agree (strongly or somewhat) that God exists.
In 2008, the question was more detailed. A “yes” on belief
was given to people who answered that there is definitely
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a personal God or who said there is a higher power but no
personal God. Regrouping categories helped us minimize
the effects of different question wordings.
A second drawback is the relatively small sample in
2008 compared with 2001. Nevertheless, ARIS 2008 is
a representative national sample of the American adult
population. A third issue concerns limited availability of
data critical to understanding social divisions and culture
wars. The only available data was on attitudes towards
human evolution. Clearly a battery of questions on highly
contested issues that the American public grapples with,
such as abortion, climate change, gun control, immigration, and same-sex marriage, would help determine the
correlation between religiosity and worldviews. To compensate for the limitations of the ARIS data, GSS findings
were also included. The corroboration from the GSS validates the ARIS findings by showing similar patterns and
trends. Also, the GSS questions were identical in each
of the three years, strengthening the significance of the
observed trend.
Fourth and finally, neither the ARIS series nor GSS were
designed as longitudinal studies and they do not track
the same individuals over time. To capture the dynamic
and characteristics of shifts along the religious-secular
spectrum researchers would have to follow people over
their life course—from adolescence to young adulthood
and further as they develop romantic partnerships, get
married and become parents. These life events involve
decision-making on religious behavior and participation.
Following the same individuals over time would also shed
light on the role of socio-demographic factors and help
predict future trends. A longitudinal design could shed
light on the sequence of transitions from a religious to
secular society. which trigger people to alter their religious behavior, identification and belief.
Discussion
The ‘de-Christianization’ of American society, namely the
sharp decline of those identifying with Christian denominations from 86% of the population in 1990 to 76% in
2008 (ARIS 2001 & ARIS 2008) and to 73% in 2012 (Pew
2012), was not offset by a rise in new religious movements
(as predicted by Stark, 2000; Barker, 1989) but rather
by a rejection of all organized religions and the marked
increase in the ‘none’ population to 16%-20% of the adult
population. Of course, this still leaves a great majority
of people retaining a religious identity, though many of
them don’t belong to a religious institution or participate
in religious services.
The notable rise of the Nones, people who profess no
religion, began in the 1990s (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006;
Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Chaves, 2011) but remained
under the radar for a long time. Even the ARIS 2001, which
showed the growth of Nones from 8% in 1990 to 14% in
2001, was met with skepticism. In a USA Today article in
March 2002, for example, American sociologist of religion
Rodney Stark said, “People aren’t really saying, ‘I have no
religion.’ …they are just unchurched.” It took a few years
until corroborating results – 14% of Nones found by GSS
2004; 15% by Pew (2007); and more recently 20% (Pew
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2012) – stirred the public and religious leaders to grapple
with the secularization trend (Religious New Service, 2012).
This paper demonstrates that the growing secular segment of the American population is becoming heterogeneous. On the eight-point religious-secular spectrum, the
last two groups on the grid (yes, yes, yes & yes, no, yes) are
classified as ‘religious America’ and the six other groups,
22% of the population, as ‘secular America.’ Obviously
these latter 55 million adults are not all similar to each
other. They include men and women, young and old, poor
and rich. They live in the East, West, North and South.
For religious America there is more stability among the
(yes, yes, yes) than among the (yes, no, yes). The latter segment seems to lose adherents. Furthermore, all combinations indicating ‘yes’ to attendance in services are losing
adherents. It is possible that the path from a religious to
a secular mode is first manifested by a drop in religious
service attendance. Durkheim made this point a century
ago. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915:44)
he wrote that “the idea of religion is inseparable from the
idea of a Church” and “religion must be an eminently collective thing.” The “Church” is far weaker than it was in
Durkheim’s time. Rather than participation in religious
activities following from belief, it may be more common that belief follows from religious activities. As more
Americans turn away from religious services, I expect religious uncertainties and disbelief will grow.
The most secular segment on the grid, the (no, no, no)
group, has doubled in the first decade of the 21st Century.
Some deliberately depart from the majority and from
the traditional American norms, while others drift into
this minority status. Their youth and high educational
level hint at possible further growth and their potential
influence on the general population beyond their relative minority. In this project I showed that the secular
extreme is growing at the same time as the religious
extreme is declining.
Norris and Inglehart (2004: 18) asserted that,
The United States remains an outlier among
postindustrial societies, having a public that holds
much more traditional worldviews than that of any
other developed country except Ireland. But even
in America, there has been a lesser but perceptible trend toward secularization; the trend has been
partly masked by massive immigration of people
with relatively traditional worldviews…but when
one controls for these factors, even within the U.S.
there has been a significant movement toward
secularization.
The findings presented here support the conclusion on
contemporary trends of American religion by Chaves
(2011: 110): “no indicator of traditional religious belief or
practice is going up. There is much continuity and some
decline.” And, “If there is a trend, it is toward less religion.”
The current paper demonstrates the growth of the
most secular, and the decline in the religious segments
and groups in the middle. The process is complex but for
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the most part consistent. Remarkably, the surveys show
a wide-ranging migration in the population from (yes,
yes, yes) toward (no, no, no). This paper has explained the
“what.” Further research is required to establish the “why.”
The religious-secular scale also demonstrates that the
most religious and the most secular are at opposite poles
on at least one critical ideological and educational issue,
evolution. As illustrated in Figure 5, their opinions regarding human evolution pull them in opposite directions –
the most religious definitely reject human evolution while
the most secular definitely believe in human evolution
– and create sharp social divisions. This 8-point scale is
not the final word. It may apply to some religious groups
better than others. Still, by providing a simple metric of
religiosity and secularity, it could become a useful tool for
social scientists. Further research should be conducted to
determine whether the scale is useful in predicting attitudes toward other controversial matters.
Since the religious majority is only slowly eroding and
it is the young who are most likely to be in the growing
secular minority, it is likely that culture wars over polarizing issues, like reproductive rights and human evolution,
will be with us for a long time to come.
Notes
1
For details on ATUS methodology, see http://www.bls.
gov/tus/atusfaqs.htm#1.
2
This reflects a somewhat growing acceptance of atheists as earlier opinion polls showed that 53% of Americans would not vote for an atheist as president (Pew
Research Center, 2003).
3
Respondents were asked if the statement: “Human
beings, as we know them, developed from earlier species of animals,” is true or false or if they were not sure.
4
European countries, Japan and the U.S.
5
About 2% refused or were not sure
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